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Herlihy writes of the Black Death, “the plague caused divisions between the healthy
and the sick, those in the cultural mainstream and those in the margins… and
between the mass of society and its cultural leaders”. Those in the margins of
society included strangers, travelers, beggars, lepers, Jews, the poor… the list
goes on. Towns routinely closed their gates to all outsiders. During the plague of
the 1890s, the medical community in Argentina ascribed the outbreak of plague
in Paraguay to the “backwardness” of a nation they considered “marginal to
civilization”, writes Myron Echenberg in Plague Ports. In Cape Town, the threat of
plague was used to further entrench residential segregation, and in Pacific ports
accounts of racism towards persons of Asian descent were common. Indeed, as
Paul Slack comments in his introduction to Epidemics and Ideas, this is the one
common feature of almost all epidemics:
“[C]arriers of disease were identified and scapegoats stigmatized:
foreigners most often, as in Renaissance Italy and modern Hawaii, since
epidemic disease came from outside, but also inferiors, carriers of pollution
of several kinds, among whom disease had its local roots – untouchables
in India and ex-slaves in Africa, or Jews at the time of the Black Death. For
their part, inferiors themselves thought epidemics the consequence of plots
by external enemies, or governors and elites, to ‘poison’ the poor.” (4)
Ziegler’s account of the persecution of Jewish communities during the Black Death
also mentions persecution of Arabian people in Spain, English people in France,
and lepers in England. The existential invisible threat of disease tends to make us
close up reflexively and turn inward. It divides us precisely when coordination and
cooperation is most needed.
Of course, this is counter-productive and self-destructive. When the plague arrived
at Messina in 1347, the city’s residents knew it was too late to save themselves, and
yet insisted on retribution towards those who had brought the disease – in effect
spreading it all across the Mediterranean. Ziegler tells the story of how a Tartar
army, upon discovering plague amongst their ranks, catapulted the corpses of their
dead over the walls of the city they were laying siege to. In India in the 1890s, when
British colonial authorities heavy-handedly and indiscriminately flooded houses with
disinfectant, they spread the rats carrying the disease across neighborhoods and
cities (see Chandavarkar). During the Black Death, Paul Clement VI issued a papal
bull discrediting the rumors that Jews were spreading the disease, in an attempt to
halt the persecution. He pointed out the obvious: the plague is spreading in areas
without Jewish communities, and Jewish communities are also victims of the plague.
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His arguments fell on deaf ears: in Basel, for instance, Jews were penned up in
wooden buildings and burned alive. Ziegler points out that there were economic
reasons for wanting Jewish communities out of the way.
Indeed, the very urgency of infectious diseases makes them powerful tools to be
yielded in self-interest, often against the common purpose of defeating the epidemic.
Valeska Huber describes how Britain stonewalled the creation of an International
Agency of Notification for the reporting and tracking of infectious diseases in 1885.
The reason was political self-interest: it would have hampered their control over the
Suez Canal. Her account of the International Sanitary Conferences (1851-1894)
details how, despite general recognition of the common global threat of cholera, the
conferences were heavily skewed towards European interests. A stark example can
be seen in how Egypt is described in these negotiations between colonial powers as
a “natural barrier to the invasion of the epidemic from the tropics”.
Herein lies the close interplay between international relations, law, and infectious
diseases. Whatever the delineation of the “we”, it is almost certain to be insufficient
and self-defeating, unless it is global. Epidemics don’t recognize borders. And
more than this: epidemics closely follow our own traversing of borders – spreading
along trade routes and the patterns of interactions among peoples. The history
of quarantine and western public health law is usually traced back to Ragusa
(modern-day Dubrovnik) and Venice – for obvious reasons: these were hubs for
travel and trade, venues for international interactions. Eugenia Tognotti details the
close historical connection between infectious disease, trade, and legal-institutional
responses such as quarantine and the establishments of bills of health.
It is not only trade. As John Henderson points out in Florence under Siege: Surviving
Plague in an Early Modern City, there is more to the connection between war
and combating disease than mere poetic license: armies literally carried endemic
and epidemic diseases with them. This was perhaps nowhere more apparent
than in the Americas: McNeill estimates that, within 50 years of Cortez’s arrival,
the indigenous population had been reduced by 90% – in large part due to the
spread of infectious disease. Infectious diseases are not only a consequence of
the globalized world, in other words, they shape it. Elizabeth Kolbert describes this
in her article in her New Yorker (reviewing Loomis’s Epidemics and Snowden’s
Epidemics and Society): the decline of Justinian’s Rome, the lead-up to the Russian
Revolution, large demographic shifts across the globe. Ziegler links the Black Death
to the acceleration of the 1381 peasants’ revolt in England and the Reformation
as a response to erosion of public trust in the Church. Much has been made of
the Malthusian effects of the Black Death, including its impact on European labor
mobility and increased productivity.
The impact of epidemics spread even beyond the reach of bacteria and viruses.
Even if a particular community could avoid the health risks of the disease, the
economic impact of epidemics has always been mobile. This is a lesson we need
no reminding of today. Ziegler relates the records of loans made in the French town
of Perpignan when the plague arrived there in April 1348. In February of that year,
there had been 25 loans, in March, 32. In the first 11 days of April, there were eight;
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three in the rest of the month, and none until August 12th. In a short and fascinating
read on the impact of the outbreak of plague in seventeenth-century Tuscany
– Faith, Reason, and the Plague – Carlo Cipolla writes about the hunger and
destitution that followed in the footsteps of lockdowns and quarantines. This aspect
of epidemics has only accelerated, due to what Aberth terms the “third transition” in
his Plagues in World History – the globalization of disease environments. Huber talks
of the increased velocity of transport and communication as an important impetus
for the International Sanitary Conventions – these steps towards a standardized
approach were a response to the rising perception at the time of “unlimited and
borderless space”. This “closing in” of the world and with it the risk of disease is
especially apparent in Plague Ports, as the book takes us around the world with
the third bubonic plague: from Hong Kong to then-Bombay, Alexandria and Porto,
Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, Honolulu and San Francisco, to Sydney and Cape
Town. The “we” in question seem to almost inevitably be: “all of us”.
Why, then, are epidemic responses so fractured, localized, and politicized? Because,
even if the “we” spans the globe, we seem unwilling to yield the “how” that far.
The “how” almost always drives us towards a smaller “we”. Here, the incongruity:
the matter of survival necessitates a global, universal, transnational reaction. But
the political and public nature of that reaction seems to drive us towards limited,
parochial, and fractured responses. The extent of public power needed (residual
power? police power? emergency powers?) is only available at much lower levels.
To conquer an epidemic, exceptional public power is needed. In her book on
medieval Ragusa (State of Deference), commonly listed as the site of the first
instance of quarantine, Susan Stuard describes the expanding role of civil agency in
securing the health of the city. It was to this end that the Ragusan council set up a
hospice outside of the walls of the city. By 1377, the council had taken more drastic
steps, first introducing a 32-day forced isolation period and later forbidding the
import of wheat, fruit and cloth from locations known to harbor the plague. Historical
accounts all confirm that spread of infectious disease could only be combatted by
the establishment of public authority with sweeping powers and harsh enforcement
mechanisms.
In Florence under Siege, Henderson describes the Italian public health ministries
and their authority. It was an integrated and sophisticated system predicated on
the strength of the Italian city-state. Health officials, backed by guards and other
enforcement-mechanisms, instituted a system of forced lockdowns, invasive
surveillance and reporting, and quarantine, often running into conflict with the church
and with lower levels of government. Cipolla relates the detailed communications
between health officials in the Tuscan town of Monte Lupe and authorities in
Florence, often asking for more guards in order to enforce the strict public health
measures against which the villagers rebelled. Epidemics seem to invite, and indeed
demand, the intrusion of public power into what usually lies securely within the
private.
There seem to be limits on how far removed authority can be before such intrusions
are no longer tolerated. Cipolla writes of the insurrection in Monte Lupo against
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the Health Magistry in Florence. Chandavarkar discusses the disobedience and
desertion of colonial subjects and officers in response Britain’s intrusive public
health policies. Cities and towns close their doors to higher authorities, physicians
defect, people blatantly flaunt their disregard for health rules. In the US, the recent
demonstrations insisting on “opening the economy” bears morbid resemblance to the
citizens of Monte Lupo insisting, against the Ministry’s orders, to attend mass and a
procession of clergy. The event lead to a new flare-up of the plague and many more
deaths.
Of course, over time, authorities become better at inducing compliance. And
these technologies of governance spread globally. In another testament to the
international and transnational impact of infectious disease, history shows us how
the public health governance methods developed by the Italian city-states spread
to England and across the world. Henderson writes that advisers to the Privy
Council in England often looked to Italian Health Boards for guidance on how to
combat disease. Gradually, these technologies and institutions were disseminated
into British colonies as well. Paul Slack writes that the policies and institutions
developed in these contexts proved politically – and legally – seminal. They changed
assumptions about the responsibilities – and powers – of government. He continues:
“the obligation of governments to act to protect the public when epidemics threaten,
even at the price of some limitations on private liberties, is something we now take
for granted.” But it was once a controversial novelty. As he explains: “most of what
we understand by public health, its basic rationale and ideology, was first formulated
in the context of the plague.” From there, it became transferred and transplanted –
and transformed – into particular national and local contexts around the world.
Inevitably, expanded public action threatens to expose both authority’s fragilities and
its excesses. Fragilities, because epidemics reach the body and the first political
question. Excesses, because the threat of fragility invites repression. As much as
epidemics present opportunities for the assertion of brute public power, they also
illuminate the fragilities of existing systems of authority. In Plague Ports, for instance,
Echenberg illustrates how the outbreak of plague in mainland China and Hong
Kong helped provoke the demise of the Qing dynasty, in part due to the birth of the
“revive China society”, started by Sun Yet-Sen, a young physician disillusioned by
the  authorities’ seeming inability to protect citizens from the plague. Protests in
Wuhan earlier this year echo this experience. This means that epidemics are as
much a threat to power as an opportunity to assert it. Which leads to abuses. Indeed,
much of the history seems to portray health crises as the scenes of broader political
clashes and ongoing power struggles.
The third pandemic of the 1890s coincided with an era of western cultural
imperialism, and it showed. Bhandarkar describes in Epidemics and Ideas how the
outbreak of plague in India led to far-reaching invasive and draconian measures by
the colonial officials. He also points toward the relaxation of all such measures once
the disease became known as one that only affects the poor and the “natives”.
In Rio, the discourse around sanitation and “civilization” was ill-disguised code for
“washing out” the Afro-Brazilian population. In Hong Kong, the British used medical
control of the plague as one of their arguments for extracting more territory on the
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Chinese mainland. Similarly, outbreaks of syphilis have been used to criticize the
liberation of women. In Epidemics and Ideas, we encounter the following argument
published in 1908 in The Lancet – arguing that the increased ‘freedom’ granted to
Bagandan women in Uganda had led to the syphilis epidemic:
“… the freedom enjoyed by women in civilized countries has gradually been
won by them as the result of centuries of civilization, during which they have
been educated… Women whose female ancestors had been kept under
surveillance were not fit to be treated in a similar manner. They were, in
effect, merely female animals with strong missions, to whom unrestricted
opportunities for gratifying these passions were suddenly afforded.”
Epidemics reveal the worst in us. Even after the science was firmly in favor of an
international standardized reporting procedure for purposes of preventing cholera,
the political implications and the power shifts it demanded proved too high a cost for
those participants who had the luxury of making such calls.
And this struggle extends to the scientific and epistemic. Modern science has itself
become a site of contestation. Huber describes medical science as a realm of
national competition and political nationalism. History seems to confirm that diseases
are constructed and defined within the context of power-struggles and oppression.
In the Americas, the Spanish settlers’ immunity to smallpox (due to exposure back
in Europe) was used to argue that God was in favor of the Spanish conquest. False
theories about how AIDS gets contracted persisted long after science should have
disproven them. The 1890s saw a global clash within western science between older
sanitarian traditions and newer bacteriological approaches. Unsurprisingly, sanitarian
traditions that allowed for more draconian public health enforcement lasted much
longer in the colonies than in Europe.
The narrative in most of these histories also display such distortion: the common
narrative that places Western practices of quarantine at the center of the discovery
of public health is also a politicized one: Paul Slack argues that such innovations
really had their origin in the Persian Gulf and the Muslim Mediterranean. Of course,
science and knowledge are themselves contested. Paul Farmer points toward the
political and geo-political consequences of, for instance, naming certain diseases
“tropical”. On the one hand, the rise of consensus around modern medicine has
reduced this. But it would be naïve to think that current consensus is objective
and untainted by power-dynamics. Indeed, perhaps most striking is that the rise of
modern medicine seems not to have eliminated the use of medicinal advice and
public health action from being abused for other, malignant political ends. Paul
Farmer makes this point in his book, Infections and Inequalities – when we think
about our knowledge of disease, we should ask “what is obscured in this way of
conceptualizing disease? What is brought into relief?”
I see similar questions playing out in the current debate about the relationships
between race and COVID-19 health outcomes in the US. There is a similar tug-of-
war about whether body weight is a risk factor for COVID-19. This is a contest about
which characteristics are to be included in the “disease profile” and which not, and
what such inclusion means, and it is a contest that has far-reaching political and
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social impact. Think of the recent accusations of racism in China, for example. The
same point has been made about politicians downplaying the danger of COVID-19
or doubting the mortality rate. Which is also not new. Echenberg writes about
newspapers in Buenos Aires reporting, in the midst of the outbreak of bubonic
plague, that “the disease is of an extraordinary benign character”, and that the
reports about death rates were “greatly exaggerated”.
As much, then, as epidemics demand global co-operation, they also invite conflicts.
Conflicts where, as Huber says, the boundaries between disciplines, nations,
and cultures are defined. And the outcomes have been unbearably unequal. As
the world is scrambling to buy up ventilators, CNN recently reported that South
Sudan had a total of four. Four ventilators in a nation of 12 million people. The
data from COVID-19 confirms what Paul Farmer has been saying: “patients with
poor outcomes – those living in poverty, by and large, with minorities and women
overrepresented – ha[ve] them because of barriers to effective care”.
This Jean-Jacques Rousseau quotation that Farmer cites is appropriate here:
“Are you unaware that vast numbers of your fellow men suffer or perish
from need of the things that you have to excess, and that you required
the explicit and unanimous consent of the whole human race for you to
appropriate from the common subsistence anything besides that required
for your own?”
But taking the whole human race into account would place the public nature of the
“how” unbearably far from our bodies. Or so, at least, we seem to have concluded.
 
This is the second of two parts of this post with reading recommendations on
epidemics, international law, and history. The first part can be found here.
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